Perceptions of Customary Land Tenure Security  in Western Province of Zambia by Jain, Niraj et al.
International Journal of Social Science Studies 
Vol. 4, No. 2; February 2016 
ISSN 2324-8033 E-ISSN 2324-8041 
Published by Redfame Publishing 
URL: http://ijsss.redfame.com 
78 
Perceptions of Customary Land Tenure Security  
in Western Province of Zambia 
Niraj Jain
1
, Roy Chileshe
1
, Francis Muwowo
1
, Majory Lupiya
1
 
1
School of the Built Environment, the Copperbelt University, Kitwe, Zambia  
Correspondence: Niraj Jain, School of the Built Environment, the Copperbelt University, P. O. Box 21692-Kitwe, 
Zambia.  
 
Received: December 24, 2015   Accepted: January 19, 2016   Available online: January 21, 2016 
doi:10.11114/ijsss.v4i2.1264    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.11114/ijsss.v4i2.1264   
 
Abstract 
This paper presents the empirical findings of a research study undertaken in the Western Province of Zambia. The 
principal objective was to explore if the issuance of land ownership certificates (LOCs) improves the customary 
landholders‟ perceptions of security of tenure. Thus, we test a null hypothesis that: „There are no significant differences 
in the perceived security of tenure between customary landholders with land ownership certificates and customary 
landholders without land ownership certificates‟. A survey was undertaken of customary landholders and land 
administration officials using structured in-depth interviews and group discussions. The research used a mix of 
qualitative and quantitative approaches where the views of customary landholders with certificates were compared with 
those with none based on a security of tenure assessment framework. It was revealed that the land ownership certificates 
(LOCs) provide the customary landholders with a perceived protection from losing land rights. However, the LOC does 
not improve other perceptions of customary landholders towards tenure security. In fact most of the perceptions of 
customary landholders with land ownership certificates are statistically not any different from the others. All customary 
landholders perceive their tenure as secured under the customary land administration in Western Province. The paper 
concludes by stating that the absence of a legal recognition renders the LOC insignificant in enhancing the perceived 
security of tenure. Legal recognition of the customary land administration system in Western Province of Zambia is 
therefore recommended. 
Keywords: Perceived Security of Tenure, De jure Security of Tenure, De facto Security of Tenure, Customary 
landholder, Land Ownership Certificates (LOC) 
1. Introduction 
Numerous works have been commissioned to explore tenure security around the world but little has been done in 
Zambia particularly in the rural environment. Literature shows that there is hardly any disagreement on the strength of 
formal property rights in bestowing security of tenure. In fact, statutory tenure raises little concerns as it grants de jure 
security of tenure. Customary tenure on the other hand, tends to be a subject of discussion in many research works. 
Customary land rights are based on local customs and not formal or state title deeds as is the case with statutory tenure 
(Van Asperen & Mulolwa, 2008). Consequently, there has been a growing concern from the international community to 
reform customary land by converting it to statutory tenure (Lamba, 2005). Such reforms, however, are said to be the 
very cause of tenure insecurity on customary land, for example, people fear that their customary land can be 
expropriated by government and allocated to private investors at any time (Chileshe, 2005). It therefore becomes 
essential to explore how the customary land tenure system can be strengthened in itself. In this context, the customary 
land tenure system in Western Province provides several unique lessons. 
Quite unlike other chiefdoms in the Country, Western Province has a land administration system where Land Ownership 
Certificates (LOCs) are issued as a proof of customary land ownership (Roth et al, 1995). And this seems to be a 
growing trend in many other countries in the sub-Sahara Africa where countries like Tanzania, Botswana and Uganda 
issue customary title deeds to landholders (Sundet, 2005; Willy, 2003; and Kalabamu, 2000). A priori knowledge 
suggests that such traditional titles of ownership should provide a security of tenure since a title deed is perceived by 
many as the definite proof of ownership (Deininger, 2003). 
This raises many fundamental questions as to whether such traditional titles of ownership in effect enhance the 
perceptions about security of tenure at the grassroots level. Empirical findings can be significant in that they can be 
used by policy makers to either roll out the issuance of customary titles of ownership to other Chiefdoms in the country; 
or develop empirical- based strategies on how such titles of ownership can be integrated into the formal statutory 
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system. 
Hence, using a survey approach, this research paper investigates if the perceptions of customary landholders in Western 
Province of Zambia with some proof of landownership are any different from those with none. The paper commences 
by presenting background literature on security of tenure, customary land tenure and the land administration system in 
Western Province of Zambia. In subsequent sections, the methodology, results and discussions and conclusions are 
elaborated. 
2. Background 
2.1 Perceived Security of Tenure 
Security of tenure has been defined in many ways by scholars, viz.: Mitchell (2011) describes security of tenure as the 
degree at which there is certainty of people, the state or other entities recognizing the land rights that belong to others 
and that there is a level of protection in the event that a landholder‟s rights are threatened. It is conjectured that security 
of tenure provides: lower transaction costs (Feder, 1987; Hollingsworth, 2014; and Deininger et.al., 2006); social 
stability through lesser conflicts and disputes (DFID, 2007; and Deininger et.al., 2006); higher agricultural productivity 
(Feder, 1987; Adams, 2004 and Smith, 2004); sustainable development (Holden, 2006; Quan et al., 2004); and fiscal 
planning and revenue generation (UN-Habitat, 2008). 
Deininger and Feder (2009) claim that the positive effect of security of tenure on investment has been evidenced in 
China, Thailand, Latin America, some parts of Africa and Eastern Europe. Paradoxically, some studies reveal that 
investments in land may not be as a direct result of security of tenure. Payne and Quan (2008) and Deininger (et al, 
2006) assert that de jure security of tenure provides a collateral for accessing credit for developing land. But there are 
arguments that even though people have title deeds they are unable to access credit because they are either reluctant or 
just not willing. Critics have failed to find empirical evidence to show how title can possibly provide an avenue for 
accessing credit easily and at a cheaper cost (Brasselle et al, 2002). Besides, Hollingsworth (2014) identifies many other 
requirements as pre-conditions for credit worthiness such that security of tenure ought to be understood differently. 
According to the UN-Habitat (2008), security of tenure is “a feeling of safety in holding a piece of land.” Broegaard 
(2013) reinforces this understanding by stating that security of tenure is about being safe in the expectation of reaping 
the rewards of one‟s investments. This definition contends that security of tenure ought to be about the perceptions 
landholders hold with respect to their land. 
Traditionally, the highest form of security of tenure is believed to arise from de jure rights granted by the State (see for 
example Lanjouw & Levy, 2002; Deininger, 2003). However, Usamah et al (2012) contend that de jure security of 
tenure might be legally legitimate but may not necessarily be socially legitimate. 
On the other hand, de facto security of tenure is said to be socially legitimate but may often exist without legal 
recognition of land rights (Payne, 2001). It has to do with a mutual understanding between the landholders and the 
community and/ or social relations. Scholars in fact add that the mere recognition by the community and social relations 
confer more security to landholders as opposed to recognition by statutory bodies. This implies that de facto security of 
tenure may actually be more important than de jure security of tenure. This assertion is supported by Hollingsworth 
(2014) and Lanjouw & Levy (2002). 
Hollingsworth (2014) and Van Gelder (2010) in fact suggest that security of tenure is more of a psychological variable 
that consists of both the states of thinking and feeling. Doebele (1978: 111), states that even though tenure is considered 
as legal it is just a matter of the „state of mind’ of the landholders. Therefore, security of tenure is what the landholders 
perceive it to be. Payne (2001: 421) provides that, “it is undeniable that perceived security of tenure is widely accepted 
as a precondition for households to invest in house construction or improvements. This is not the same thing, however, 
as saying that full titles are the only means of achieving acceptable levels of security.” Payne and Durrand- Lasserve 
(2012) also add that perceived security of tenure is more important than its legal recognition. Usamah et al (2012) add 
that landholders are capable of investing their capital in construction and expansion of houses as a result of confidence 
arising from the perceived security of tenure that they have. 
2.2 Customary Land and Security of Tenure 
Customary tenure refers to the holding of land based on customs/traditions (Van Asperen & Mulolwa, 2008). Land 
ownership of this category relates to the communal possession of land rights. In most cases a single person in the group 
administers this on behalf of the entire group (Payne & Durand-Lasserve, 2012). And the role of Chiefs on customary 
land is to act as a regulator of acquisition and use of land (Van Loenen, 1999).  
This type of tenure is found in most African countries and land held under such conditions is regarded as sacred. As 
such, the role of landholders is to protect the land for the interests of the past, present and future generations. Land 
rights that can be held as: individual rights, communal rights and concurrent interests (Chileshe, 2005). Although 
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permanent, theses rights may end by transfer, abandonment, death or expulsion from the community. 
The customary land tenure system is therefore regarded as being insecure. The tenure insecurity results from the lack of 
legal title deeds (Deininger, 2003). The absence of de jure security attributes to the lack of protection of land rights by 
the state. Thus, when other people make claims on their land, land holders fear that their land rights will be expropriated 
(Lamba, 2005). In fact, Chiefs tend to abuse their positions to accumulate wealth by depriving the indigenous people of 
their land rights and extracting monetary benefits from strangers (Akrofi and Whittal, 2011). This also contributes to the 
tenure insecurity that customary landholders face. Besides, poor governance practices (Akrofi and Whittal, 2011) and 
corruption (UN-Habitat, 2014) are all equally said to be an impediment in the security of tenure.  
Nevertheless, most customary landholders are said to enjoy de facto security of tenure or perceived security of tenure 
(Hollingsworth, 2014) and are content by the mere plantation of trees on their lands to indicate that the plot is already 
occupied (Van Asperen and Mulolwa, 2008).  
Customary land tenure in some neighbouring countries like Botswana and Tanzania draws its strength from dedicated 
legislative instruments that provide for the establishment of customary tenure- its allocation process and; more 
importantly the issuance of certificates of title. Take for instance, the Tribal Lands Act of Botswana provides for the 
establishment of land boards and gives them all the land related powers that once belonged to Chiefs (Bornegrim & 
Collin, 2010). The Act lays out procedures to be followed when granting certificates of customary land (Republic of 
Botswana, 2010). White (2009: 1) states that the Tribal Lands Act vests, “all the rights and title to land in each tribal 
area … in the land board … in trust for the benefit and advantage of the tribesmen of that area and for the purpose of 
promoting the economic and social development of all the peoples of Botswana.” According to Kalabamu (2000) the 
land administration system in Botswana has prevented Chiefs from abusing their authority and allocating big portions of 
land to themselves or selling land on their own. 
The Village Lands Act of Tanzania is not very dissimilar. It decentralizes the administration of village land to the village 
(Sundet, 2005). This means that the Act empowers the villages to manage and administer their own lands. The Village 
Lands Act statutorily recognizes customary land rights.  
Not so distant, the Ugandan customary land tenure equally draws its efficacy from the Lands Act of 1998. It 
decentralizes the management and administration of customary land in Uganda (Willy, 2003). One of the functions of 
the land boards created under this Act is to oversee the land rights held by landholders in Uganda (Rugadya, 1999). 
Additionally, customary tenure is fully recognized as equal in legality with the other three formal land tenures in 
Uganda (Willy, 2003). Certificates of customary ownership are issued by district land boards (Willy, 2003). This 
certificate is the definite proof/evidence of ownership.  
Evidently, these nations provide a de jure security of tenure quite unlike the practices in Zambia. Land in most 
customary areas of Zambia is still managed and administered by Chiefs who do not grant any form of evidence to show 
landownership. Rampant cases of evictions and displacements within the customary lands are a clear testimony (Van 
Asperen & Mulolwa, 2008) e.g., in Mpongwe (Copperbelt Province), farmers were evicted from 46, 876 hectares of 
customary land by a South African based agribusiness (Mulenga, 2014).   
Furthermore, external factors also contribute to the insecurity of tenure. These external factors, according to Chileshe 
(2005) include: availability of an alternative tenure, introduction of the money economy and increase in population 
pressures. It is reported that when outsiders were allocated customary land, they applied for statutory title deeds (through 
conversion) (Chileshe, 2005). The absence of proof of ownership therefore makes people insecure. 
2.3 Customary Land Administration in Western Province of Zambia 
Prior to the commencement of the British colonial rule in 1880s, all land in Zambia was administered and managed by 
indigenous institutions through the use of customary laws (Adams, 2003). Around the 1890s, agents of the British South 
African (BSA) Company went to Lewanika (the Lozi King) in Barotseland (now Western Province) with the intention of 
securing concessions over land (Roth et al, 1995). Resulting from this was the authority of the BSA Company to have 
control over land in Zambia. Nevertheless, the BSA Company was not allowed to control land in the whole of Western 
Province (Metcalfe & Kepe, 2008). This meant that the Litunga still maintained power over land. Hence, when the 
Northern Rhodesia (Crown Lands and Native Reserves) Order in Council of 1928 was passed, the Barotseland was not 
affected by the then newly created Crown Land and Reserves (M'membe, 2005; Sichone, 2008). The unique and separate 
existence of Barotseland continued to exist as such through the orders made between Lewanika and the BSA Company. 
On 18
th
 May 1964, the Barotseland Agreement was passed. This Agreement was made by the Government of Northern 
Rhodesia (now Zambia) and the Litunga of Barotseland (GRZ, 1967). The Agreement enabled the Litunga to continue 
enjoying the greatest measure of responsibility for land administration in Barotseland (Adams, 2003). 
Post-independence, reforms were made to the land tenure system. Land in Zambia could only be held (and is still only 
held) either under customary tenure or statutory tenure (Sichone, 2008). However, the Litunga‟s control over land in 
Western Province persisted until the enactment of the Western Province (Land and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act of 1970 
(M‟membe, 2005).  
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Although, Chiefs are the institutional bodies of land administration as recognized by the Constitution of Zambia (Van 
Asperen and Mulolwa, 2008), the Lands Act (No 5 of 1995 of the Laws of Zambia) does not recognize Chiefs as owners 
of land. All 73 tribes in Zambia administer land based on their unique customs and traditions (Mulolwa, 2006). 
Differences in traditions are seldom insignificant (Chileshe, 2005) because many exhibit similarities in their land 
administration systems. In most cases, Chiefs are dependent on village headmen for assistance in the land 
administration system. Customary land is generally not directly allocated by Chiefs. Instead, Chiefs allocate land to sub 
Chiefs who in turn allocate land to village headmen who are responsible for the allocation of land to villagers (Nsemiwe, 
2007). 
3. Methodology 
This paper presents the findings of an empirical research study designed to investigate whether the land ownership 
certificates issued in the Western Province of Zambia enhance customary landholder‟s perception about security of 
tenure. In doing so, the researchers also sought to document the land administration process in the Province.  
An assessment framework was designed based on the works of UN- Habitat (2011), Hollingsworth (2014) and Kiddle 
(2011). Hollingsworth (2014) identifies a number of key proxies for measuring security of tenure from academic 
literature and monitoring initiatives of UN agencies and several other organisations. Perception of security is however, 
not adequately captured by Hollingsworth (2014). Kiddle (2011) raises some intriguing questions about perceived 
security of tenure that are integrated into the Hollingsworth (2014) framework. The consolidated framework therefore 
focuses on a number of relevant indicators for establishing the perceived security of tenure as shown in Table 1. 
Table 1. Indicators of Perceived Security of Land Tenure 
Ref Relevant Indicator Details 
1.  Perceptions of future loss Risk of losing a land right 
2.  Recognition of land rights held Recognition by State, Traditional Land Administration Authority 
and local community 
3.  Availability of title Ease of issuance; its essence and role in security 
4.  Loss of rights in the past Actual instances of loss of land rights 
5.  Threat of evictions Protection from Traditional Authority 
6.  Bundle of rights held Autonomy in right to sale and; exclusivity in enjoyment 
7.  Access to credit Actual instances or perceived 
Description: A framework for measuring perceptions about security of land tenure Source: Adapted from Hollingsworth 
(2014) 
The study was generally qualitative in nature, although quantitative tools (particularly, the Fisher‟s Exact Test) were 
used to test the following hypothesis: 
Null Hypothesis (Ho): There are no significant differences in the perceived security of tenure between customary 
landholders with land ownership certificates and customary landholders without land ownership certificates; and 
Alternative Hypothesis (H1): There are significant differences in the perceived security of tenure between customary 
landholders with land ownership certificates and customary landholders without land ownership certificates. 
With the help of the Barotse Royal Establishment (BRE), the researchers identified a traditional settlement with the 
highest concentration of customary landholders with LOCs- the Malengwa settlement in Mongu. Limulunga area, 
which forms the capital of the customary areas (and houses the main Kuta- the Lozi traditional court as well as the 
Litunga) was also incorporated in the study. However, due to poor record keeping, the actual number of customary 
landholders could not be established. Hence, after extensive consultations and negotiations with the BRE, the sampling 
size of customary landholders had to be restricted to fifteen interviewees in each of the two strata (those with LOCs and 
those without LOCs). In the wake of the controversies surrounding the 1964 Barotseland Agreement, land related 
matters are very sensitive in Western Province such that a larger sample size was not possible. 
Nonetheless, since data saturation occurs by the 12
th
 interview of a homogenous group (with a Cronbach‟s alpha of 0.7) 
(Guest, et.al., 2006 cited in Saunders, et.al., 2009), 30 interviewees (15 in each of the two strata of customary 
landholders) were considered adequate for this study. Further, two members of staff were identified from each of the 
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statutory institutions; and three members from the BRE (Table 2). 
Table 2. Sampling Frame 
CATEGORY  
(sampling units) 
INTERVIEWEE 
(units of inquiry) 
NUMBER OF 
INTERVIEWEES 
Custodians of customary 
land 
Barotse Royal Establishment (BRE) members  
3 
Statutory institutions Mongu Municipal Council Officers 2 
Ministry of Lands  
(Lands Department in Mongu) Officers 
 
2 
 
Department of Agriculture in Mongu Officers 2 
Landholders within the 
chiefdom 
Customary Landholders with LOCs  15 
Customary Landholders without LOCs 15 
Description: Categories of interviewees identified for the research study Source: Authors, Field Survey 2014 
In identifying the actual interviewees from the two strata of customary landholders, the BRE, the Mongu Municipal 
Council, Ministry of Lands and the Department of Agriculture, the snowballing approach was used. 
Interview guides were designed for all sample members while group discussions were focused on the BRE members. 
A reconnaissance visit was undertaken in order to develop a rapport in the Province. In fact, most traditional leaders do 
not entertain surprise visits. Many consider it to be disrespectful. As a result, a senior chief (known as Induna Inete) 
who is also a member of the Lozi traditional court „Kuta’ and the Barotse Royal Establishment (BRE) played a pivotal 
role in establishing the contacts for this study. The fieldwork was settled for one week in the month of November 2014. 
Qualitative data was analyzed using the narrative approach where themes were created from the interviewees‟ answers. 
This approach allowed us to preserve the integrity and, convey actual social understandings of perceptions held by 
customary landholders. Furthermore, audio/ video-recordings of interviews were made to thoroughly capture the field 
data. 
4. Case Study Profile- Mongu 
Western Province comprises of 7 districts namely: Lukulu, Kaoma, Kalabo, Senaga, Sesheke, Mongu and Shang’ombo. 
The provincial capital: Mongu that was selected as the study area of the research is bordered by Senaga, Kalabo, Kaoma 
and Lukulu (See Figure 1). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Locational Map- Western Province (Adapted from Wikipedia, 2015) 
Mongu district of the Western Province was selected because it has a well- organized customary land administration 
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system and forms the administrative hub for the Litunga. 
5. Results and Discussion 
5.1 Litunga and the Barotse Royal Establishment (BRE) 
The Litunga is the overall head of the customary land administration system in Western Province. In fact he is referred 
to as „Minya-Mupu-Na-Ngombe‟ (the owner of land and cattle). As a member of the BRE and the Kuta, the Litunga is 
privy and final authority to all land related matters. In Lozi, it is stated: “FoKutabile ngweshi” meaning that, “where 
the King has pierced no man can remove.” (BRE Group discussions, November 2014) 
The above statement signifies that if the Litunga makes a decision no one can oppose or refute it. Customary land in 
Western province is administered by BRE which consists of many members starting (in hierarchy) with the Litunga (at 
the top), Senior Chiefs (Induna Inete), Sub-Chiefs also known as area chief (Induna wa Silalo) and ordinary Indunas 
(Induna wa Silalanda). Other members of the BRE include the “Ngambela” and the “Natamoyo”. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. The Barotse Royal Establishment (BRE) 
Description: Composition of the Barotse Royal Establishment (BRE) showing various categories of Chiefs and Royal 
family members being headed by the Litunga(Source: Authors, Field Survey, 2014). 
The “Ngambela” is the prime minister. He is the Litunga‟s spokesperson. This is because the Litunga does not 
communicate directly with his subjects. It is the “Ngambela’s” responsibility to act as the medium of communication 
between the Litunga and his subjects. Another role the “Ngambela” plays is to stand for commoners in the day to day 
activities of the community.  
The role of the “Natamoyo” is that of a Minister of Justice. S/he pleads on behalf of the individuals in the community. 
The “Natamoyo” is a member of the royal family and is also called the “the mother of life/saviour.” Every district in 
Western Province is headed by a senior chief. He is also referred to as an “Induna Inete”. 
Like the land boards (in Uganda and Botswana) and Village land councils (Tanzania), Western Province has counts 
(“Silalo”) and sub-counts (“Silalanda”) which have similar roles and responsibilities at differing levels of authority- 
resolving disputes, allocating land and implementing customary laws. 
The “Silalanda” is headed by ordinary Indunas (Induna wa Silalanda) and is subordinate to the “Silalo”. Whereas, the 
Silalo is headed by area/sub-chiefs (Induna wa Silalo) and is made up of Silalandas. The Silalanda comprises of 12 
villages. 
5.2 Traditional Land Ownership forms 
According to the Mongu Municipal Council all land in the district (about 10,720km
2
) is held by the Litunga. A mere 
30km
2
 is regulated under the statutory tenure. It was also found that there are five traditional forms of landownership. 
The Mubu-Wa-Ngweshi, which refers to all land that belongs to the Litunga. It is passed on from one Litunga to the 
other. This is the parcel of land from which the Litunga allocates land to people who request/ apply for land acquisition. 
Such land may be allocated for purposes of settling, agricultural or development. 
The Mubu-Wa-Luu land is given to individuals who are said to be the custodians of customary land. These include the 
senior chiefs, sub- chiefs and members of the Royal family. Acquisition of this land is attached to the position an 
individual holds in the BRE. 
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Mubu-Wa-Bana-ba-Malena is held in trust by members of the Royal family. It is passed on from one generation to the 
other. However in cases where there is no one to inherit the land, it escheats to the Litunga. Management of this land is 
undertaken by the Royal family with the help of the Indunas.  
The fourth form, the Mubu-Wa-Lusika is „owned‟ by the subjects. It is passes from one generation to the next.  
And the final form called the Mulalambuwa does not belong to any one and no one inhabits it. An individual interested 
in acquiring this land must follow prescribed procedures through the Silalo Indunas. 
5.3 Land Allocation and Dispute Resolution 
Some interviewees claimed that there is a set of written rules used by the BRE in customary land administration. 
However, these were never made available to the authors. Nevertheless, since the state does not provide any legal basis 
for customary tenure, such rules (if existing) will be ineffective in providing de jure security of tenure.  
In any case, land allocation in Western Province begins from the household level (Lozi family members). Every 
indigenous person (i.e., Lozi person) in Western Province is entitled to a parcel of traditional land whether female or 
male. The family members acquire land through inheritance or as gift. However, if a family runs out of land, they may 
approach the village headman known as “Sibuku” in Lozi. The village headman allocates land if available. 
Notwithstanding the status quo, if the village headman has no land available, the applicant is referred to the “Silalanda” 
and thereafter progressively to the “Silalo”. The latter comes in when the “Silalanda” is unable to allocate land from 
within the 12 villages. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Customary Land Administration process in Western Province 
Description: Customary land administration process in Western Province showing the two streams: land allocation and 
dispute/conflict resolution. The process commences from the householders‟ level and then gradually ends at the level of 
the paramount Chief (Source: Authors, Field Survey 2014). 
In addition to the above bodies, the area/sub-chiefs are also responsible for land allocation when the “Silalo” is unable 
to do so. Next in the hierarchy is the Senior Chief- the “Induna Inete”.  
At the apex is the Litunga, who is the overall authority from whom any person can acquire land if all other subordinate 
channels have proved to be futile. This effectively means that land is allocated at all levels based on availability. 
However, the LOC is only granted by the BRE. 
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Figure 4. Dispute/ Conflict Resolution process in Western Province 
Description: Dispute/Conflict resolution process in Western Province. It is shown that the Indunas play a pivotal role in 
land conflict resolutions(Source: Authors, Field Survey 2014). 
Like the lands tribunal in Botswana, the “Kuta” is responsible for handling conflicts amongst customary landholders. 
However, its functions are not only restricted to land disputes, the group discussions also revealed that the “Kuta” is 
responsible for scrutinizing people who apply for land. The head of the “Kuta” is the Senior Chief and in most cases 
handles matters of conflict at the provincial level. However, he does not unilaterally take decisions but involves other 
Indunas in the area. There is a “Saa-Kuta” which is a Lozi traditional court at the district level. Customary landholders 
in Western Province appeal to the “Kuta” for dispute resolution only where the headman fails to satisfactorily 
adjudicate in the Saa-Kuta.  
Members of the “Kuta” include the Litunga though he only attends selective meetings, the senior chiefs, 
area/sub-chiefs and ordinary Indunas. It was found that the main “Kuta” is located near the Litunga‟s residence in 
Limulunga (Mongu, Western Province). 
5.4 The Land Ownership Certificates (LOCs)  
Based on the group discussions held with the BRE, it was found that long before the introduction of LOCs in the 
Western Province, customary land allocation was similar to other customary areas in Zambia where customary land is 
allocated by “mere word of mouth” (see also Sichone, 2010). Back then, a person interested in land would approach the 
village headman for assistance in acquiring land. The village headman would in turn go to the superior bodies of land 
administration for example the Silalanda to request for land on behalf of the interested party. In this case, the “Kuta” 
which is a Lozi traditional court would then hold a meeting to discuss availability of land for allocation. In addition, the 
“Kuta” would also establish the trust worthiness of the applicant. Successful applicants were required to pay homage 
known as “Showelela”. Showelela refers to a loyal salutation to the Litunga as a sign of receiving land and showing 
appreciation for being granted that parcel of land (Group Discussions with BRE members, November 2014). Failure to 
observe Showelela is considered disrespectful as it shows ingratitude. This Lozi custom is a must. The group 
discussions with the BRE in fact revealed that this act which signifies payment of homage signalled that the land now 
belonged to the applicant- effectively sealing the transaction. After this, the Litunga would by „word of mouth‟ state that 
the land belonged to the applicant. It is at this stage that an applicant could voluntarily acquire a LOC from the BRE on 
the recommendation of a village headman or Induna.  
The village headman or Induna is required to apply to the “Kuta” on behalf of the applicant. Following this the Induna 
or village headman physically takes the applicant to the “Kuta” for introduction and scrutiny. The group discussion also 
indicated that scrutiny is important to avoid double allocation of land. If the Induna’s report is in affirmative, the 
applicant is granted a LOC. Thus, the LOC is prepared by the BRE in consultation with the Kuta. Where the LOC is 
being sought for an old allocation, the applicant is required to Showelela again. The issuance of LOCs is solely to 
provide a proof of landownership. However, the BRE sample members acquiesced that LOCs were also necessary to 
reduce cases of land contestations. 
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Figure 5. Land Ownership Certificate (LOC) Application Process 
Description: Application Process for LOC. Note the „Kuta‟ plays a pivotal role in soliciting a LOC for the customary 
landholder(Source: Authors, Field Survey 2014). 
5.5 Characteristics of LOCs 
The group discussions with the BRE showed that the LOCs ought to include (as shown in Appendix A): 
1) The elephant  
This is used as a symbol of traditional authority in the whole of Western Province and, any document showing this 
symbol is considered binding within the Lozi tribe; 
2) The location of the land and, details of the customary landholder 
The specific location of the land is geo- referenced with physical features/land marks in an area where the land lies. 
3) A date stamp from the BRE 
The LOCs must always be endorsed by at least four (4) Indunas for it to be binding. Where land was originally granted 
by the village headman, he must also endorse on the LOC.  
It was further found that temporal LOCs are also issued in rare instances where the land allocation process was 
incomplete. 
5.6 Basic socio- economic data of landowners 
The findings show that most of the customary landholders were married (66.7%); were between ages of 35 and 50 years 
(50%); and studied up-to primary level (53.3%). 
Table 3. Socio- economic Data 
 Number Percentage 
Marital Status:   
Single  6 20% 
Married 20 66.7% 
Divorced 2 6.7% 
Widow/Widower 2 6.7% 
   
Age Distribution:   
Below 20 0 0% 
20-35 10 33.3% 
35-50 15 50% 
50 and above 5 16.7% 
   
Education Level:   
None 5 16.7% 
Primary 16 53.3% 
Secondary 5 16.7% 
Tertiary 4 13.3% 
Totals 30 100% 
Description: Basic socio- economic data of the 30 customary landholders(Source: Authors, Field Survey 2014) 
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5.7 Customary Landholders’ Perceptions on Security of Tenure 
5.7.1 Perceptions over future loss of land rights 
In Mongu, 66.7% (10) customary landholders with LOCs felt secure while very few without LOCs held a similar 
perception (33.3% only). When customary landholders without LOCs were asked to give reasons why they felt insecure 
they attributed it to the fact that Indunas in the area easily change their decisions. They stated that: 
“Indunas might allocate a parcel of land to an individual but later on give it to another. It is thus important to have a 
document that can prove landownership.” (Personal communication with customary landholders, 2014) 
This statement indicates that even though the Kuta scrutinizes availability of land, lack of precisely locating land 
parcels can devastate the land administration process. The survey also revealed that, already allocated plots are 
sometimes sub-divided for onward allocation to other people. Hence, customary landholders without LOCs feel 
insecure.  
Moreover, no customary landholder with LOC claimed to feel insecure. In fact, the BRE members confirmed that in 
times of land contestations, customary landholders with LOC were favourably considered.  
5.7.2 Perceptions on the recognition of customary land rights by the local community, the Customary land 
administration system and the State  
Security of tenure is enhanced when the land rights of customary landholders are recognized by others- statutory bodies, 
customary bodies or people in the community generally. The recognition can either be legal or socially legitimate. From 
the works of the UN-Habitat (2011), this recognition gives landholders a confidence over land.  
The findings reveal that 100% (15) of customary landholders with LOCs feel that their land rights are recognized by the 
local community since they hold a BRE endorsed land ownership certificate. As for the customary landholders without 
LOCs, 60% (09) stated that they feel their rights to land are recognized by members of the community while the other 
40% (06) claimed that their land rights are only partly recognized. The plausible explanation provided for the latter 
finding is that these specific individuals were settlers and not indigenous people of Western Province.  
The significance of these findings is that there exists a social cohesion in the local community that grants a perceived 
security of tenure whether de facto or otherwise.  
It was also found that all customary landholders (30) unanimously agreed that their land rights were fully recognized by 
the customary land administration system. However, their land rights are not statutorily recognized (de jure). 
5.7.3 Perceptions on the essence of LOCs in land security 
It was found that 66.7% (10) of customary landholders with LOCs and 93.3% (14) of customary landholders without 
LOCs think LOCs or any form of proof of landownership are necessary to feel secure. In fact, 73.3% (11) of the 
customary landholders with LOCs perceive to be better protected than their counterparts. 86.7% (13) of customary 
landholders without LOCs stated that: 
„…yes LOCs are a necessity especially in customary areas where there are no written laws that customary institutions 
should abide by as is the case on statutory tenure.‟ (Personal communication with customary landholder) 
Furthermore, only 6.7% (1) of customary landholders with LOCs think that LOCs are not really that important for 
customary land. It was felt that after all the LOCs are not recognized beyond the traditional boundaries of Western 
Province. 
5.7.4 Perceptions over losing land rights 
The findings were that 66.7% (10) of customary landholders with LOCs think they are protected from losing their land 
whereas only 13.3% (02) of customary landholders without LOCs think they have protection. Moreover, customary 
landholders with LOC also said that: „[they] …can use their documents to prove their rights to land therefore there is no 
need for them to feel threatened‟ (Personal communication with customary landholder). 
The customary landholders without LOCs who claimed to feel protected stated that no one can attempt to take their land 
because people in the community know who has which parcels of land- social legitimacy (Usamah et.al., 2012). 
The confidence that customary landholders have over their land can also be observed from the investments made to land. 
Most structures/houses on customary land were of a permanent nature using a combination of bricks and bamboos; or 
even blocks. Others were just built using local materials. 
5.7.5 Perceptions on the administrative capacity in protection against evictions/ displacements 
Based on the argument that landholders are secure if they believe that authorities have the capacity to protect them 
against evictions and/or displacements (UN-Habitat (2011), the study found: 86.7% (13) of the customary landholders 
with LOCs believe that they are protected against evictions whereas only 46.7% (07) of customary landholders without 
LOCs feel protection will be provided to them if they face a threat of evictions/displacements. 
5.7.6 Perceptions of the Bundle of legal rights held (rights to sell and exclusive use) 
All customary landholders stated that they are not allowed to sell their land irrespective of whether they hold a LOC or 
not. And being a sacred free gift from God, no monetary value could be assigned to land. Further, evidence from the 
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field survey showed that both strata of customary landholders have the right to deny others from using their land unless 
prior permission was sought. Apparently, the LOC played no role in generating a favourable perception on the right to 
exclusive use. 
5.7.7 LOC and its perceived role in the access to credit 
The research also tried to establish whether customary land in Western Province was used as collateral for accessing any 
form of credit- formal or informal. Of all the customary landholders, no one had attempted to access credit using their 
parcel of land as collateral. Traditional land was confirmed to be sacred that could not be sold. And using it as collateral 
was believed to be selling it. Ng‟ombe and Mushinge (2014) in fact add that rights under customary land can only be 
transferred through bequest. 
5.7.8 Statistical Significance in the differences in the perceptions of customary landholders with/without LOCs 
The Null Hypothesis (i.e., There are no significant differences in the perceived security of tenure between customary 
landholders with land ownership certificates and customary landholders without land ownership certificates) was tested 
using Fisher‟s Exact Test at a 5% significance level for each of the proxies established for the security of land tenure. 
The results are presented in Appendix B and, clearly show that the Null Hypothesis should be accepted on all 
counts/proxies (with the exception of one) suggesting that there is no significant difference in the perceptions held in the 
two strata over security of land. 
On one count, however, that of protection from losing land rights, the Fisher‟s Exact test suggests that the perceptions 
of the customary landholders with LOC are statistically different from those of the others. Evidently, customary 
landholders with LOCs better perceive the strength of their land rights. 
6. Conclusion and Recommendation(s) 
This research shows that the traditional land administration system of Western Province is well organised and 
decentralised. It has a clearly defined process with responsible officials accountable at each level. The Barotse Royal 
Establishment (BRE) issues land ownership certificates (LOCs) that are locally binding but lack legal legitimacy. 
Nevertheless, all customary landholders perceive their land tenure under the customary land administration as secured. 
Hence, it can be inferred that the traditional land administration practices in Western Province collectively provide a de 
facto security of tenure.  
It is shown in this research that the provision of land ownership certificates (LOCs) provides the customary landholders 
with a perceived protection from losing land rights. However, it does not entirely improve other perceptions of 
customary landholders towards tenure security. The LOCs are insignificant in enhancing the customary landholders‟ 
perceived security of tenure. The only plausible reason could be the absence of a legal recognition for these certificates 
within the Country.  
The research makes the following recommendations. In order to address tenure insecurity on customary land, land 
ownership certificates should be encouraged and recognized as legal evidence of land ownership. De jure security of 
tenure will strengthen all perceptions held by customary landholders in Western Province. Specific provisions for 
customary land rights should be made in the land policy. Additionally, a statutory instrument should be issued under the 
provisions the Lands Act No. 5 of 1995 of the Laws of Zambia recognizing the customary land rights of landholders in 
possession of LOCs. An effective institutional framework should also be put in place. The experiences of Botswana and 
Tanzania provide an invaluable resource in this regard where the Land Boards and Villages are respectively granted 
legal recognition in the land administration process.  
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Appendix A 
Sample land ownership certificate (LOC) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Description: A replica of the Land Ownership Certificate (LOC) - Western Province Source: Adapted from BRE 
Records 
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Appendix B 
Table 4. Fishers‟ Exact Test on Data from Customary Landholders in Mongu (Zambia) 
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